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The Road to Transformation
Ascending from the Decade of 
Darkness
Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley
Nobody likes mistakes. Fewer yet like to revisit errors – to analyze, discuss or study them. 
They are often an embarrassment and remind us 
of our fallibility and shortcomings. It is always 
much easier to celebrate our achievements and 
successes – that leaves everyone with a warm 
feeling. However, although it is always preferable 
to avoid making mistakes, once they occur 
they are important and must be recognized as 
such. They speak to our weaknesses as both 
individuals and institutions. They are signals, if 
not alarms, to warn us of deficiencies that must 
be addressed. In fact, it has often been said for 
good reason that one can learn more from one’s 
mistakes than from one’s successes. 
 The military has always been bad at accepting 
this premise. Mistakes are often construed as a 
sign of weakness or inability and many perceive 
them as potential career-ending events. Such a 
zero tolerance to mistakes breeds an environment 
of risk aversion, micro-management and 
stagnation. It kills initiative and experimentation. 
And, it avoids examining mistakes in detail – lest 
blame insidiously spread its evil tentacles and 
taint others in the chain of command. However, 
this state affairs leads to atrophy within an 
organization. 
 It takes strong will and determination to break 
such a cycle. Normally, crisis is the only catalyst 
that compels leadership within an organization 
to take action, and even then it is difficult. The 
Department of National Defence (DND) and the 
Canadian Forces (CF), particularly the officer 
corps, found themselves in such a situation in 
the late 1980s and 1990s. By 1997, they were 
at the lowest ebb of their history. They had lost 
the confidence and trust of the government 
and Canadian people they served. They were 
stripped of their ability to investigate themselves. 
Furthermore, they were not trusted to implement 
the recommended changes forced upon them 
by the government and an external committee 
was established as a watchdog. Whether the 
leadership wanted to admit it or not, and they 
vehemently denied it at the time, there existed 
some substantial and deep rooted problems with 
DND, the CF and the officer corps. They were 
caught in a decade of darkness. 
 The road to this sad state was a long one. The 
assault on the CF and its senior leadership in the 
late 1980s and into the 1990s was cataclysmic. 
The well known Cold War paradigm, with its 
clear polarities of “us” and “them” disappeared 
almost overnight. The new security environment, 
marked by complexity, ambiguity, enemies and 
threats embedded in failed and failing states and 
an ever present media, overloaded a traditional, 
conservative and intellectually inflexible officer 
corps that saw the world in terms of absolutes. 
As if this was not enough, a government facing 
debilitating fiscal deficits looked to the military 
for a post Cold War “peace dividend” to solve 
part of its problem. Like all parts of government 
operations military spending came under sharp 
scrutiny even as available funds were slashed. 
 These pressures stressed the CF. Scandals 
and the bungled attempts at dealing with them led 
to the loss of government trust and a widespread 
loss of trust on the part of Canadian society. 
As the military’s failures, notably incidents of 
wrongdoing overseas, as well as reports of opulent 
or unethical spending and behaviour by senior 
leaders surfaced, Canadians quickly became 
incensed. Exacerbating this situation was a DND 
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leadership that was not accustomed to criticism 
or scrutiny by the public. The clear and present 
Soviet threat and spectre of nuclear Armageddon 
had always been enough to distract and silence 
critics. So they did what they always did,ignore 
the noise in the expectation that it would go away. 
They refused to explain themselves or provide 
information. They ignored or stonewalled queries 
believing that that the storm would blow over. 
If the winds were too strong they could always 
shelter behind the well tested barrier of “national 
security” and the condescending, if not arrogant, 
attitude that civilians should just leave military 
business to the professionals. That attitude only 
accelerated and deepened the government’s and 
Canadians’ loss of confidence.
 So, what happened? Canadians, much like 
the populations of most western nations, have 
never believed in large standing armed forces, and 
regarded the inherently conservative professional 
military with mistrust. However, in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, when two ideologically 
opposed superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, emerged from that conflict, the 
world changed dramatically. Exacerbating the 
political and military competition between these 
former allies of convenience was technology. The 
war had sparked exponential advancements in 
warfare; jet engines, large aircraft carriers and 
submarines, rockets and nuclear weapons made 
the world that much smaller, and countries that 
much more vulnerable. 
 In 1949, the West created the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) as a hedge against 
perceived Soviet intentions of westward expansion. 
Soon after the Soviets created the Warsaw Pact, 
dragooning its occupied territories into an 
alliance to protect them from their fear of Western 
aggression, and Europe was divided by an “iron 
curtain.” This European centric contest soon 
became a global contest, with much of the world 
falling into one camp or the other. Faced with 
the prospect of nuclear Armageddon if the major 
antagonists faced off directly, the superpower 
competition soon played itself out in proxy wars 
in Korea, Africa, and the Middle East.
 Throughout, one thing always seemed 
certain: the Cold War was just a breath away from 
becoming a hot war in which the superpowers 
could scarcely avoid using their nuclear arsenals. 
The only apparent safeguard against war was 
large Western standing forces to deter Soviet 
aggression.
 This state of affairs had a great impact on 
Canada and its armed forces. For the first time 
in its history Canada maintained large standing 
forces. In fact, Canada deployed a substantial 
force overseas, including a heavy mechanized 
brigade group and a division of fighter aircraft. 
The cold war had a major impact on international relations, 
but in retrospect it was a relatively simple period for the 
military as it provided them with a clearly deﬁned mission.
Right: Lester Pearson, Canadian minister of external 
relations, signs the North Atlantic Treaty,
Washington, DC, 4 April 1949.
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As well, the navy’s expansion to more than fifty 
warships in the 1950s was primarily to support 
Allied forces in Europe. These large NATO 
commitments quickly became the raison d’étre of 
the CF despite the fact that Canadian government 
policy always attempted to retain a robust second 
pillar for foreign and defence policy anchored in 
the UN. This created ongoing, albeit low grade, 
tension in civil-military relations. 
 The Cold War,  despite i ts  possible 
consequences, was in retrospect a simple era 
for the military. The threat seemed frighteningly 
real. Pictures of huge missiles pointed towards 
North America, impressive May Day parades 
in Moscow that revealed a large and very lethal 
military arsenal, the continued Soviet occupation 
of territory liberated from Germany in the 
Second World War and the brutal suppression 
of nationalist movements therein, reinforced the 
need for large Western forces. In the event this 
was not enough, every year (coincidentally around 
budget appropriation time) the US Department 
of Defense published its glossy The Soviet 
Menace, which showcased the Soviet Union’s 
bulging military arsenal. In sum, governments 
and their publics could easily recognize the 
threat. Accordingly, the military was provided the 
necessary budget and generally left to secure the 
Western way of life in the prosperous post war 
era. 
 The military had a clear mission, to counter 
the Soviet threat. Governments generally left 
that mission’s implementation to the military 
professionals. National security dictated secrecy 
and the Soviet’s active espionage campaigns, 
which often were made quite public once 
compromised, reinforced the need for a heavy 
cloak of secrecy on all things military. As a result, 
the military could easily hide behind this veil to 
avoid explaining those things it preferred not to 
discuss. A very closed mindset developed, one 
that avoided public disclosure and was indeed 
contemptuous of it. The military knew best, 
and those who did not serve could not possibly 
understand the intricacies of national security. 
 A second aspect of the simplicity of the Cold 
War was the operating environment. The world 
was largely divided into two spheres, NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact, and each was careful not to 
interfere prominently in the other’s sphere. The 
containment of such events as the Hungarian 
Revolution in 1956, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
1962, and the Czechoslovakian Revolution in 
1968 (Prague Spring) provide clear examples of 
the unwritten understanding that existed. When 
a superpower became involved in a regional 
war, as in Vietnam, the Middle East, Angola, or 
Afghanistan, the other, even while supporting the 
enemy, did so in a manner calculated to avoid 
direct confrontation. Equally important, both 
camps generally ensured that the particular 
regimes or insurgencies they supported did not 
unduly challenge the global status quo. 
 Even peacekeeping during this period fell into 
the clearly understood model. Peacekeepers were 
only employed when both antagonists agreed 
to their presence. Their role was to monitor a 
ceasefire or peace agreement once the fighting 
had stopped. Their employment was always 
within a prescribed boundary, the buffer zone 
between the two former warring parties. The 
operating environment was very clear. Each side 
was clearly delineated by its front line and all 
participants were in clearly identifiable national 
uniforms. Moreover, there were rarely civilians 
or press to deal with, and when they did visit, it 
was under carefully controlled circumstances. 
Once again, the military was allowed to operate 
in almost complete isolation.
 The relative simplicity of the operating 
environment bled into the very fabric of the 
institution. The Cold War bred a technology-
centric culture. What became important was 
one’s capability of being a technically proficient 
warfighter. After all, the enemy was almost 
perfectly symmetrical, nearly a carbon copy of 
its antagonist. Weapons inventories and tactics 
were designed to fight a conventional (and 
possibly nuclear) war against forces of a similar 
type. Everything had a clear template. Soldiers, 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers 
were taught Soviet order of battle and tactics. 
Exercises revolved around standard scenarios, 
such as the arrival of the combat reconnaissance 
patrol of a mechanized motor rifle division, 
which would indicate exactly what the enemy 
consisted of and where he was located. Based on 
the distances from friendly front lines, it could 
now be determined what tactics he would adopt. 
In essence, the key to training was learning the 
enemy’s order of battle. Training institutions 
provided lessons, handbooks and exams on the 
Soviet enemy. Students would memorize the 
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organizational composition (including numbers 
of personnel, specific weapons and their ranges, 
vehicles and tactics) from section level to division 
and higher depending upon rank level. 
 NATO policy and doctrine, dictated largely 
by the “Big Boys” of the organization, relieved 
Canada of much of the burden of strategic, as well 
as operational, decision making. Canada’s tactical 
role, whether on the Central Front in Germany or 
its Allied Command Europe (ACE) AMF(L) [ACE 
Mobile Force (land)] role in Northern Norway, 
reinforced the simplicity of the Cold War for the 
CF. It knew its role, its routes to the front, its 
actual fighting positions and the exact enemy it 
would face. Much of the training revolved around 
rehearsals for the possible showdown between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the actual ground 
and exact fighting positions where this would 
happen. 
 Within the CF, the Cold War nurtured the 
traditional military concept that leadership is a 
top-down hierarchical action that depends on 
unit command and experience in specific types 
of staff appointments to prepare individuals 
for higher command at the strategic level. 
Within this model, higher education had little 
importance. It stressed training (a predictable 
response to a predictable situation) to the virtual 
exclusion of education, a reasoned response to an 
unpredictable situation, that is, critical thinking 
in the face of the unknown. 
 In fact, a rabid anti-intellectualism thrived. 
Those seeking higher education (a masters 
degree, as a PhD was unfathomable) were deemed 
suspect; they were obviously trying to prepare 
themselves for a life outside the military. What 
was important within the military hierarchy were 
individuals who understood the system: the 
operating environment; the Soviet enemy; NATO 
doctrine and standard operating procedures; and 
Canadian equipment, tactics, and staff work. 
Significantly, this fervent anti-intellectualism 
denuded the officer corps of individuals capable 
of, or willing to undertake, analysis, critical 
thinking, reflection and visioning in the larger 
geo-political and societal context. The inherently 
conservative and traditional military mind frame, 
compounded by its hierarchical, authoritative 
and closed structure fed a system that not only 
ignored, but actively closed itself to, outside 
thought and criticism.
 CF leadership doctrine embodied an industrial 
era model that focused on output. In essence, if 
the mission was successful, the commander had 
by definition showed leadership, whether the 
task was completed in spite of the commander 
or not. If the task failed, the commander was 
obviously let down by his subordinates. Clearly, 
within such a model, mission success at any cost 
became the key factor. Throughout the Cold War 
commanders cloned themselves and thereby 
they assumed they ensured the well-being of the 
institution. Through the years, the myopic view 
and isolation created an officer corps that was 
intolerant of criticism, self-scrutiny or wider 
intellectual stimulation. Experienced Cold War 
technicians, who did not rock the boat and 
supported the status quo, tended to do well. 
 In 1987, the Conservative government’s 
bold Defence White Paper, Challenge and 
Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, 
was welcomed with open arms by the military. 
It represented a reinforcement of the Cold War 
mentality, large conventional forces such as heavy 
mechanized forces in Germany and nuclear 
submarines. It also represented a halt to the 
continual downward spiral of defence spending 
that started in 1964, with the Liberal White Paper, 
and remained unabated ever since. However, the 
Conservative White Paper proved to be fleeting in 
its influence, and that did not bode well for the 
CF.
 The destruction of the Berlin Wall in December 
1989, which is now universally accepted as the 
end of the Cold War, left the CF and its leaders at 
a loss. What now? The Cold War was over. We had 
won. Moreover, the government and the public 
expected a peace dividend. With the Soviet threat 
eliminated, why maintain large military forces? 
Moreover, the Canadian government was facing 
a colossal deficit that was dragging down the 
national economy, devaluing the Canadian dollar 
and scaring off foreign investment. DND, with the 
largest discretionary budget of any government 
department, became a natural target. 
 The new world order quickly began to unravel. 
Former proxy states of the superpowers, now 
left to their own devices without the necessary 
economic subsidies to survive, or the security 
infrastructure to hold together fragmented ethnic 
and culturally diverse populations, quickly 
spiraled into chaos. Failed and failing states 
The role of peacekeeping was 
also a clearly understood model. 
Peacekeepers were only employed 
when both antagonists agreed to their 
presence. Their role was to monitor 
a ceaseﬁre or peace agreement 
once the ﬁghting had stopped. Their 
employment was always within a 
prescribed boundary, the buffer zone 
between the two former warring 
parties.
Here, members of the peacekeeping 
mission to Cyprus meet with 
representatives from Greece and 
Turkey, August 1974,
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mushroomed. In their wake civil war, ethnic 
cleansing and genocide erupted on the global 
scene. 
 Appalled by the scenes of horror and 
inhumanity beamed into living rooms by the nightly 
news, publics soon pressured governments to 
act. As a result, the West as individual countries, 
as well as a collective entity under UN auspices, 
soon dispatched military forces to bring order to 
the chaos. But, the attempts were awkward and 
ineffective. Manpower ceilings and equipment 
tables contrived to cut costs for the “peace 
dividend” and a politic desire not to present too 
warlike an image to the publics in the West fell 
short of providing the troops and the resources 
needed on the ground. Attempting humanitarian 
aid peacekeeping operations in an environment 
where there was still an active war in progress 
and where none of the belligerents welcomed the 
interference of UN troops created frustration, 
risk, and inefficiencies for the soldiers of the 
missions. The difficulties also showcased the 
UN’s ineffectiveness in the new world order. 
Member nations were unable to reach consensus, 
and unwilling to provide mandates with the 
necessary level of force; for these reasons the 
international organization was unable to provide 
the necessary command and control structure 
to react in a timely and effective manner, and 
missions floundered. 
 From the CF perspective, troops were sent 
into harm’s way without adequate resources, 
rules of engagement or 
coherent engagement policy. 
At the same time the CF was 
deploying a record number of 
troops on an unprecedented 
number of operations even as 
its budget was being slashed. From 1989 to 2001 
the CF deployed on approximately 67 missions 
compared to 25 missions during the period 1948 
to 1989. Yet, in 1994 to 1999 alone, the CF was 
reduced from approximately 90,000 to 60,000 
personnel, civilian staff was cut almost in half 
and the annual military budget was slashed by 
almost $2.7 billion, representing a 23 percent 
reduction.
 At this time of extreme institutional stress, 
Canadian contingents in the Former Yugoslavia, 
Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda had 
incidents of unprofessional and in some cases 
criminal behaviour. Questionable shootings 
and other disciplinary infractions, particularly 
drunkenness, as well as black marketeering and 
the misappropriation of funds and resources 
created scandals. There were also revelations in 
Canada of questionable practices, particularly 
the use of government resources for personal 
purposes by senior officers in DND. The 
bombardment of negative press eroded the CF’s 
credibility. 
 It was the torture killing of a teenage detainee 
by Canadian soldiers in Somalia on 16 March 
1993 that proved to be the catalyst that sparked 
the implosion of the CF officer corps. The killing 
was horrific enough. It tarnished the international 
image of the “do-gooder” Canadian peacekeeper. 
Moreover, it assailed the Canadian public’s 
perception of its soldiers who seemingly no longer 
represented Canadian ideals or values. What 
The role of peacekeeping was 
also a clearly understood model. 
Peacekeepers were only employed 
when both antagonists agreed to their 
presence. Their role was to monitor 
a ceaseﬁre or peace agreement 
once the ﬁghting had stopped. Their 
employment was always within a 
prescribed boundary, the buffer zone 
between the two former warring 
parties.
Here, members of the peacekeeping 
mission to Cyprus meet with 
representatives from Greece and 
Turkey, August 1974,
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made a bad situation worse, however, was DND’s 
response to the crisis. Faced with increasing 
criticism from the media and the public at large, 
the senior DND leadership, both civilian and 
military, decided to stonewall the detractors. 
Falling back on their Cold War experience and 
mindset, they attempted to ignore the criticism 
and, when this failed, they selectively released 
information often in a misleading manner. These 
tactics quickly led to charges of a cover-up at the 
highest levels in National Defence Headquarters, 
which later were proved to have substance. 
 For the Canadian officer corps this was a low 
point in its history. As a corporate group it was 
unable or unwilling to realize that the world no 
longer fit the archaic Cold War paradigm in the 
face of substantial and significant geo-political 
and societal changes. Its failure to uphold a 
healthy military ethos, the values, beliefs and 
expectations that reflect core Canadian values 
and the imperatives of military professionalism, 
was catastrophic.
 The general election of 1993 swept in a 
new Liberal government. Tiring of the public 
criticism and frustrated with the seeming lack of 
cooperation from DND, the new administration 
established the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia to 
examine the events and causes of the killing in 
Somalia. Not fully understood by many in the 
military, this action was decisive. It indicated that 
the government no longer trusted the military 
to investigate itself, and thereby stripped a key 
attribute of any profession, self-regulation, from 
DND and the CF. Although many tried to deny the 
implication, the CF officer corps had reached a 
new low. 
 In turn, the Commission, frustrated by an 
apparently obdurate officer corps, produced a 
scathing report, finding that “a failure of military 
values lies at the heart of the Somalia experience.” 
Of the 160 recommendations in the report, 112 
were leadership and management related. The 
Minister of National Defence (MND) ultimately 
endorsed a total of some 250 recommendations 
for change, including the vast majority, 132 out 
of the 160, put forward by the commission, and 
many others from his own Report to the Prime 
Minister, the Report of the Special Advisory 
Group on Military Justice and Military Police 
Investigative Services; the Report on the Quasi-
Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence, 
and the Report of the Special Commission on the 
Restructuring of the Reserves. The accepted 
recommendations covered virtually all aspects 
of the functioning of the DND and CF. 
 However, confidence in the military’s 
leadership had sunk to such a low level that 
the government also established a Minister’s 
Monitoring Committee on Change in the 
Department of National Defence and the 
Canadian Forces (MMC) to “monitor progress 
with respect to the implementation of change…” 
General Maurice Baril, a former Chief of the 
Defence Staff (CDS) conceded, “Undeniably, 
the 1990s represented the first strong test of 
the contemporary Canadian officer corps and 
we found part of it was broken.” He added 
“experience in and of itself was not enough.” 
 This realization should not have been a 
revelation. Thirty years earlier, another former 
CDS had already alluded to the danger. “It 
matters little whether the Forces have their 
Leopard I tanks of 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade on exercise in Germany, 1987.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre LRC86-057-4
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present manpower strength and financial budget, 
or half of them, or double them,” warned General 
Jean V. Allard, “without a properly educated, 
effectively trained, professional officer corps the 
Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the 
best mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.” 
 The military, because of its anti-intellectual 
and conservative nature as a corporate body, 
simply ignored Allard’s warning and the warnings 
of many others. Certainly the requirements for 
officer education, training, and professional 
development has been a long-standing concern. 
As early as 1947, Brooke Claxton, the MND, 
asserted that officer training was “one of the 
most important matters to be dealt with in the 
organization of the Armed Forces.” Indeed, officer 
professional development (OPD) has been the 
focus of myriad studies. In 1947, the Inter-service 
Committee on Officer Training recommended 
that a university degree be the entry standard 
for any officer. In addition, it suggested that the 
Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and 
Royal Roads Military College in Esquimalt be 
established as tri-service military colleges where 
aspiring officers would receive their university 
education. This was substantially implemented, 
and in 1952, a third service college, le Collège 
Militaire Royal (CMR) was opened at St Jean, 
Quebec to ensure francophones had an equal 
opportunity. Nevertheless, despite the existence 
of the three service colleges and the creation 
of a Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) that 
subsidized officer cadets who attended civilian 
universities, only a third of all serving officers 
actually possessed university degrees during the 
1950s and 1960s. Although the Canadian officer 
corps was highly credible and well-respected by 
its allies in the post–war era, detractors were 
concerned that the system of officer development 
was unable to create a bilingual officer corps, and 
there seemed to be a large leakage of expensively-
educated and well-trained officers who left the CF 
before normal retirement age. 
 In 1969, as a result of the upheavals resulting 
from unification of the forces, the department 
created an Officer Development Board (ODB) 
under Major-General Roger Rowley, the personal 
choice of the CDS, General Allard. Rowley 
determined that an OPD system had to satisfy 
three imperatives. First, all officers had to fully 
understand the philosophy and ethic of their 
profession, and be able to devote themselves 
spiritually and rationally to its services. Second, 
all officers had to master an effective level of 
expertise. Lastly, he believed all officers had 
to be given the opportunity fully to develop 
their intellectual potential. Concomitantly, he 
explained that the OPD framework had to be 
rooted in a clarity of mission and in a set of 
moral imperatives that ODB called the “Canons 
of the Military Ethic.” These canons were Duty 
to Country, Duty to the Service, Duty to Other 
Members of the Profession, Duty to Subordinates, 
and Personal Responsibility. 
 The ODB also recognized the university 
degree as the foundation of professional expertise 
and reiterated that it had to be the academic 
threshold for entry into the officer corps. The 
Board concluded that OPD had to be provided 
through an integrated and holistic system of 
education and training that would take an officer 
from the pre-commissioning stage through to 
senior rank levels. The critical component of the 
envisioned framework was the Canadian Defence 
Education Centre, where the intellectual and 
spiritual core of the officer corps would reside. 
It was from this institution that the concepts 
of military professionalism and officership, 
essential for the future effectiveness and well 
being of the armed forces, would be developed. 
The OPD system recommended by Rowley never 
came to fruition, although some measure of its 
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continuing validity is provided by the fact that 
much of it would be resurrected by Lieutenant-
General Robert Morton’s Officer Development 
Review Board some 25 years later. 
 Professional development for senior officers 
became the focus of analysis during the 1980s. 
The crux of the matter was the fact that the 
Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, 
whose candidates were normally of major’s 
rank, was the last formal training for the vast 
majority of senior officers. Although the National 
Defence College existed for top level national 
and international studies, its enrollment was 
limited to an annual military course load of twelve 
individuals. This was insufficient, particularly 
in light of the increasing complexity of national 
security issues and the demanding environment 
at NDHQ where since the early 1970s the top 
military and civil service appointments, together 
with high-level policy and administrative 
functions, had been fully integrated. 
 Major-General C.G. Kitchen, assigned in 
1985 to address the issue, emphasized the 
social-political dynamic in which he believed 
the military profession, as part of society, had 
to be fully capable of participation. The CF, he 
concluded, had to furnish its officers with more 
and better opportunities for university studies, 
especially at the graduate level, and preferably 
at civilian universities. This idea, however, was 
quickly torpedoed by another study conducted 
by Colonel David Lightburn, who deemed the 
concept impractical. The Lightburn study, tabled 
in 1986, argued that the answer to senior officer 
OPD lay within a more structured yet flexible 
framework centered on national security studies 
rather than simply tinkering and adapting the 
existing system and creating new institutions and 
programs. In 1988, Lieutenant-General Richard 
Évraire tabled a paper that made three important 
recommendations. First, he noted that a special 
course applicable to each environment should be 
developed for senior commanders. Second, job 
related short courses and seminars should be 
created. Finally, he argued for the establishment 
of a centre for national security studies. More 
generally, Évraire emphasized necessity of CF 
personnel policies that directly supported officer 
education and training.
 None of the initiatives gained much traction. 
In fact, with the end of the Cold War and the 
severe budgetary cutbacks of the 1990s, OPD 
took a major hit. The National Defence College, 
the CF Staff School and two of the three military 
colleges (Royal Roads and CMR) were closed. 
In 1994, General John de Chastelain, the 
CDS, commissioned the Officer Devlopment 
Review Board (ODRB) under chairmanship of 
Lieutenant-General (retired) Robert Morton 
to “review the education and professional 
development required by Canadian Forces 
Officers during their careers and recommend 
a programme which meets the requirements of 
a professional Officer Corps of the future.” In 
all, Morton’s committee made 280 implicit and 
explicit recommendations. They insisted that the 
flawed officer professional development process 
in the CF was rooted in a defective and inadequate 
Officer General Specification (OGS). They also 
argued that there were major gaps in OPD 
philosophy, including “a need to develop a regime 
of professional development that has a military 
ethos woven into all aspects.” The major failing of 
the OGS was to define all elements of the military 
profession, particularly the importance of the 
military ethos. Furthermore, it did not define the 
specific training and education requirements for 
the four stages of officer development. In essence, 
the ODRB reiterated to a large degree the same 
conclusions and recommendations of the Rowley 
report 25 years earlier. 
 Throughout, the Morton report stressed 
education as a cornerstone of OPD. It set the 
minimum education standard for officers 
at post-secondary school qualification, with 
the ultimate objective for all officers, except 
those commissioned from the ranks, being 
a university level baccalaureate degree. The 
Queen’s Commission was to be recognized as the 
formal entry point into the profession of arms. 
Integral to the commission and throughout an 
officer’s service was the requirement for “an 
exemplary understanding of the ethos of the 
CF, a commitment to duty…a high standard of 
leadership…and the specific knowledge base and 
critical thinking abilities demanded of a military 
officer.” 
 Thus the ODRB insisted that military ethos 
and ethics were core elements of OPD. They 
formed the framework within which officers 
accomplished their tasks. They also set the 
officer corps apart from civilian professions. As 
a result, each developmental period (DP) of an 
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officer’s career should be designed to provide 
for these requirements. While DP 1 was the 
formative component of the system because of its 
critical role in shaping the professional character 
of newly joined officers, the remaining DPs 
should also be tailored to reinforce, mature and 
emphasize the leadership, ethos, and knowledge 
attributes of officership. 
 However, any OPD framework would be hollow 
if it did not have a sound, fully articulated military 
purpose. Morton recognized that the “primacy 
of warfighting” had to be incorporated into all 
aspects of the CF OPD system. Furthermore, 
the system also had to satisfy certain social and 
political imperatives. This included reflecting the 
bilingual nature of the nation Canada, as well as 
recognizing Canadian societal expectations such 
as the CF’s role in peacekeeping. To implement 
the new OPD system, Morton insisted that “a 
statement that outlines a flexible but well-defined 
philosophy and system within which OPD can 
function effectively and evolve in a timely manner” 
must be created. He argued such a document was 
necessary in order to construct the framework 
within which coordinated and related policies 
could be developed. Morton also believed this 
would provide the authority and rationalization 
for resources needed to support OPD.
 The Morton Report was not well received 
by the CF. Some reforms were implemented, 
including a review of the OGS to address 
some of its deficiencies, as well as to attempt 
to ensure that the document reflected the 
needs of the CF officer corps in the post-Cold 
War environment. An Officers’ Professional 
Development Handbook was written embracing 
Morton’s OPD model of four developmental 
pillars within four officer developmental stages. 
However, the ODRB Report’s overall requirement 
for a total and comprehensive restructuring of the 
OPD system was ignored. The 282 “implicit and 
explicit recommendations” that the OPD working 
group identified in the report were determined 
to be “unmanageable.” Instead, the ODRB Report 
was dissected and subsumed into the larger and 
increasingly strained CF staffing process. Those 
recommendations that were accepted still had to 
compete for scarce funds for realization. In the 
resource strapped environment this was fatal. 
In the end, the ODRB recommendations had 
very little effect on the restructuring of the OPD 
system. 
 However, the crises in the 1990s, combined 
with the Canadian societal shift, which author 
Peter C. Newman described as a movement 
from deference to authority to one of defiance, 
forced the government and military to 
transform. No longer could either hide behind 
a veil of national security. The public demanded 
accountability, responsibility and transparency 
from its government and military. As a result, 
the message, which had been resisted for so 
long, finally sunk in. “The Army was forced to 
change,” conceded Lieutenant-General Mike 
Jeffrey, a former commander of the army, “I 
mean forced.” He added, “The challenge is not 
to forget those institutional failures took place. 
We had significant failures.” This message has 
not been lost. The tragedy in Somalia sparked a 
virtual reformation of the CF officer corps and 
the institution itself. 
 New appraisal systems and succession 
planning processes were undertaken, which 
importantly diluted the influence and power 
of unofficial “regimental councils.” Moreover, 
DND established a Canadian Military Journal 
to provide a forum for professional discourse, 
discussion and debate and it undertook a public 
affairs policy that was based on transparency 
and accuracy. The department put increasing 
emphasis on its obligations under the access 
to information legislation. It also undertook a 
multitude of initiatives that addressed issues 
from employment equity, soldier and family 
quality of life, to more fiscally responsible 
management practices. With regard to professional 
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development, a series of steps were taken, some 
concurrently, some sequentially.
 One significant early initiative was the 
establishment, in 1998, of the Royal Military 
College Board of Governor’s Study Group, chaired 
by General (retired) Ramsey Withers, a former 
CDS. The study group, established outside the 
normal chain of command of the CF Recruiting 
and Education System (CFRETS) and the 
Associate Deputy Minister for Human Resources-
Military (ADM(HR-Mil)), had direct access to the 
Minister of National Defence. The eight month 
study made two major recommendations, 
out of a total of 65. The first called for a new 
model for new entry officer training, called the 
Enhanced Leadership Model (ELM). The second 
insisted that consideration should be given to 
the establishment of a CF University within the 
context of CFRETS. The first recommendation 
launched a seven year process culminating in 
a modified ELM focused on the early military 
socialization of new officer entrants. The second 
required even greater pressure and took longer to 
overcome bureaucratic inertia and other barriers 
to its final realization.
 In February 1999, the CDS appointed the 
first ever Special Advisor to the Office of the 
CDS for Professional Development (SA-PD). 
The first incumbent was Lieutenant-General 
Roméo Dallaire. The office was created in part 
to demonstrate to the Minister’s Monitoring 
Committee that a concerted effort was being made 
to address leadership issues of direct concern to 
that committee’s mandate. Even more so than 
the case of the Wither’s Study Group, it was very 
important that the SA-PD operated outside the 
chain of command and reported directly to the 
CDS on a weekly basis. 
 Given the rank and reputation of the SA-
PD this created considerable tension and even 
animosity between his office, CFRETS, ADM(HR-
Mil) and to some extent the VCDS. The lack of 
effective communication with the latter officer 
was indeed unfortunate since the VCDS oversaw 
the concurrent work being done to produce the 
important overarching CF strategy document, 
Defence Strategy 2020. This strategy did provide 
a suitable framework for the SA’s work and 
over time the VCDS began to see the merits of 
Officership 2020.
 Over the course of a year the SA’s office 
developed the Statement of Requirement (SOR) 
for Officer Professional Development entitled 
Officership in the 21st Century. The SA’s office 
maintained a good relationship with the MMC 
and the committee was supportive of its work 
while at the same time tabling reports critical 
of the rest of the department’s response to 
the minister’s report to the Prime Minister. In 
the MMC’s opinion, at this stage the CF was 
still proposing tactical solutions to strategic 
problems. The MMC considered the focus of the 
SA’s office more appropriate.
 Officership in the 21st Century was a 
compelling document that broke the log jam 
in the PD system and led to fundamental 
change. In essence, the SOR recommended the 
disbandment of CFRETS and, in more detail 
than in the Wither’s Report, described the 
requirement for a CF University. The SOR also 
strongly recommended the establishment of a CF 
Leadership Institute responsible for research and 
the creation and promulgation of doctrine and 
concept development in regards to leadership 
and the profession of arms. This institute was 
created in 2001, very shortly after the publication 
of Officership in the 21st Century. 
 Armed Forces Council considered the SOR 
at the end of 1999. Although there was general 
support for several of its themes, there was great 
consternation that the document did not have 
sufficient “buy-in” throughout the department. 
Over the previous year numerous attempts at 
collaboration by the SA’s staff had been either 
ignored or rebuffed. Caught in something of 
a dilemma, with his own SA’s advice being 
challenged by his senior staff, the CDS directed 
that the SOR go through another round of analysis 
with widespread participation throughout the 
CF. This was duly undertaken using the so-
called “Empowerment Model.” A series of large 
working group meetings, in three tiers – junior, 
intermediate and senior ranks – took place over 
the next six months. Ultimately, the revised SOR, 
now entitled Officership 2020, received formal 
endorsement by both the CDS and the Minister 
of National Defence.
 This was a cri t ical  moment in the 
transformation agenda discussed in this article. 
With the support not only of the minister, but 
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also now by both the CDS and the VCDS, real 
progress could be made. Officership 2020 
set eight strategic objectives for the long-term 
professional development of the officer corps. 
Importantly, it also specified concrete initiatives 
to make such progress possible. Of particular 
note was yet another endorsement of the CF 
University concept to ensure that the education 
pillar of professional development would receive 
the much needed attention that it deserved. 
 Secondly, Officership 2020 proposed the 
creation of three CF wide capstone manuals: the 
profession of arms in Canada manual to define, 
describe and explain the concept of Canadian 
military professionalism; a leadership manual 
to update leadership doctrine last reviewed in 
the 1970s; and a CF strategic doctrine manual 
to provide the context for PD for the next 20 
years.  While beginning the research to write 
these manuals, the SA’s office also turned its 
attention to the non-commissioned member 
(NCM) corps. If possible, Canadian NCMs were 
more mired in the Cold War mind-set than the 
officer corps. In addition, if the officer corps was 
to be fundamentally reformed what needed to be 
done with NCMs? Four senior, experienced chief 
warrant officers were added to the SA’s staff and 
an extensive analysis of the NCMs was conducted. 
The result was NCM Corps 2020, a strategic 
document that initiated a virtual paradigm shift 
in the concept of the NCM Corps and how it was 
to be developed. To be sure, there was, and still is, 
considerable resistance to the new construct that 
envisages a much higher educational component 
in NCM PD and new, more demanding, roles 
and responsibilities for NCMs. This in turn 
necessitates a different approach to the officer/
NCM team. Nonetheless, considerable progress 
is being made. 
 In terms of structure, the major result of NCM 
Corps 2020 was the establishment of the NCM PD 
Centre in St. Jean, Quebec. The centre is now the 
focus for innovative thinking about NCM PD and 
the delivery of modern, challenging leadership 
courses from the rank of master-corporal to chief 
petty officer 1st class/chief warrant officer.
 While the SA’s Office was working on NCM 
Corps 2020 the VCDS engaged the services 
of a private consulting firm to examine and 
make recommendations concerning the overall 
structure of common PD throughout the CF. 
Based on the work done in the Wither’s study, 
the Dallaire SOR and Officership 2020, they 
focused on the concept of a CF University. The 
original idea in the Wither’s study that such 
an organization could be created within the 
CFRETS framework had failed. CFRETS simply 
could not understand the vision. Consequently, 
the consulting firm’s strong recommendation 
was to establish what was now referred to as 
the Canadian Defence Academy, with the Royal 
Military College of Canada (RMC) and the CF 
Leadership Institute (CFLI) acting as its academic 
engines. 
 The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was 
officially opened in 2002, while CFRETS was 
disbanded. The new Academy Headquarters 
consisted of CFLI, the Directorate of Professional 
Development (DPD) and the Directorate of 
Learning Management (DLM). CFLI was to be 
the conceptual and philosophical engine of the 
formation, DPD was to direct the delivery of PD 
products and DLM was to develop new techniques 
and processes to deliver education and enhance 
life-long learning throughout the CF. At that 
time CDA encompassed RMC, the CF College in 
Toronto and Campus Fort St. Jean, including 
the Management School and the NCMPD Centre. 
When CDA stood up the SA’s office was disbanded 
and some of the staff moved to CFLI. Work had 
already started on two of the capstone manuals 
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directed in Officership 2020, the profession of 
arms manual and the leadership doctrine. This 
work would now be completed by CFLI.
 By 2003, the first publication was ready. 
Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in 
Canada was a seminal work that addressed 
many of the underlying problems of the previous 
decade in terms of professionalism. It defined 
professionalism as comprising four attributes: 
responsibility, expertise, identity and professional 
ideology. The latter attribute represents a claim 
to a specialized, theory-based body of knowledge 
and contains the Canadian military ethos. As 
mentioned earlier, the Somalia Commission’s 
report had stated explicitly that a failure of 
military ethos lay at the heart of the crisis, and 
Duty With Honour was designed to deal directly 
with this conclusion. To be sure the department, 
in response to the commission’s report, had set 
up the Defence Ethics Program, which produced 
The Statement of Defence Ethics. However, this 
document fell far short of the requirements of a 
truly military ethos. 
 Duty  Wi th  Honour  deve loped  the 
comprehensive “Statement of Canadian Military 
Ethos” which comprised chapter two of the 
manual. The ethos comprises three components: 
“Beliefs and Expectations of Military Service” 
(unlimited liability, fighting spirit, teamwork and 
discipline); “Fundamental Canadian Values”; and 
the four “Core Military Values of Duty, Loyalty, 
Integrity and Courage.” This ethos, together with 
the common concept of military professionalism 
espoused in the manual now serves as a unifying 
force promoting a CF identity within which nests 
the strong single service identities of the Navy, 
Army and Air Force. It now serves as the doctrinal 
base throughout the CF’s PD System.
 The next capstone manual addressed was, 
in fact, a suite of three manuals published in 
2005-6: Leadership in the Canadian Forces: 
Conceptual Foundations, and two applied 
manuals, Leading the Institution and Leading 
People. Conceptual Foundations established a 
values-based leadership construct based on the 
military ethos contained in Duty With Honour. 
The construct identified a primary leadership 
outcome and three enabling outcomes. These 
were mission success, member well-being and 
commitment, internal integration (e.g. morale, 
cohesion) and external adaptability (i.e. accept, 
anticipate and lead change).
 Based on this model Leading the Institution 
addressed system level issues such as stewarding 
the profession, visioning and change and being a 
military strategist in practical terms. It targetted 
senior officers and NCMs and was written 
with the experiences of the 1990s clearly in 
mind. Leading People is concerned with direct 
leadership at all levels. It emphasizes the military 
ethos and ethical decision-making and provides 
practical guidance with regard to achieving 
mission success while keeping the three enabling 
outcomes in appropriate balance. 
 The road to transformation did not end 
with the distribution of the first editions of the 
CF capstone manuals. If anything the terrorist 
attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, the 
publication of the Defence White Paper in 2005, 
Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan and the 
appointment in February 2005 of General Rick 
Hillier as the CDS, had demonstrated yet again 
the ubiquitous nature of change. Perhaps now, 
more than ever, there is a requirement for a highly 
educated and trained, experienced officer and 
NCM corps.
 The new phase of CF transformation initiated 
by General Hillier in 2005 affects the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of war and conflict. 
It will require a highly motivated, well educated 
and skilled Force for its full realization. Starting 
down the road to transformation in the period 
1997-2006 is just that – a good start. Only if the 
anti-intellectual, mechanistic and linear mind-
set characteristic of the Cold War has been truly 
rooted out will the CF be able to prevail in the 
complex and deadly battlespace of the early 21st 
century. The Canadian Defence Academy has a 
pivotal role to play in the rest of the journey.
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